Asymmetric Information, Capital Supply, and Venture Capital Allocation
I develop a competitive search model where entrepreneurs have projects with different levels of risk and private information about their projects' quality. The combination of low capital supply and asymmetric information can cause entrepreneurs with high quality risky projects to avoid the venture capital market. An increase in capital supply reduces the distorting effects of search and information frictions and can cause venture capitalists to increase their allocations to riskier and more valuable projects. In return, the average output per dollar of venture capital investment can increase with venture capital supply. Several other model predictions are also consistent with empirical findings.
Non-pecuniary Benefits: Evidence from the Location of Private Company Sales (with Mark Jansen)
We estimate how the non-pecuniary benefits related to the quality-of-life (e.g., clement weather) of a target firm's location affect its acquisition price. Using new data on private firm acquisitions, we find that firms in cities with a higher quality-of-life sell for a 12% premium over comparable firms in cities with a lower quality-of-life. Using an instrument, we show that the premium for non-economic characteristics of a city is in addition to any premium for the orthogonal trade-production amenities (e.g., agglomeration economies and navigable waters) that affect firm fundamentals.
A Signaling Theory of Derivatives-Based Hedging (with Fernando Anjos)
We model a commodity producing firm that has private information about future volume and requires outside financing to fund a growth opportunity. Due to costly financial distress, a firm's first-best strategy is to sell forward its future production, avoiding any price risk. Low-volume firms, however, have an incentive to mimic, which in equilibrium distorts the hedging strategy of high-volume firms. Under certain conditions, high-volume firms signal their type by hedging more than their own production volume in equilibrium. When allowing firms to use multiple types of derivatives, we show that high-volume firms use both options and forwards, while low-volume firms only use forwards. The model suggests that heterogeneous and prima facie inefficient hedging policies may be due to signaling and not speculation or risk shifting.